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INTERNAL (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

1. October Anniversary (Nov. 7) Slogans: Drafted neatly to fill as always the entire first page of Soviet newspapers (Pravda Oct. 13) the number of this year's anniversary slogans increased to an even 100 (two more than a year ago). The main themes of all current internal drives crop up repeatedly in many of the slogans: (1) lower costs, (2) raise quality, (3) improve consumer services and increase the production of consumer goods, (4) economize and reduce waste, (5) introduce complex mechanization and new technology, (6) love and respect labor, and (7) raise moral and ideological standards.

On internal topics, there is a great similarity to the slogans of last year and for May Day 1960. Some differences are of interest. The slogan "He Who Does Not Work Shall Not Eat" is played up indicating that the two-month old campaign against spongers and freeloaders may prove to have a lot of staying power. As in the 1960 May Day slogans, it seems to be considered better form to praise "the glorious CPSU founded by Lenin" rather than just praise the CPSU alone.

Although relatively less attention has been paid of late in Soviet media to the campaign appeal for overtaking the US in the per capital production of consumer commodities, this slogan appears again in the present anniversary list, using language identical to the May Day's slogan which had focused sole attention on the US as the country to overtake by eliminating the November 1959 phrase "and other capitalist countries." In general, lists of products desired in greater quantity and quality at less cost are the same as last year and for May Day 1960.

Additional slogans, which accord with current campaigns, are concerned with eliminating bureaucracy in Soviet institutions, putting more emphasis on disseminating ideological propaganda and placing more stress on the satisfaction of consumer needs, including the improvement of retail trade facilities and services. Last year's slogan to increase production in local and cooperative industries is missing. In addition to the past two anniversary appeals, the call made for an increase in kolkhoz indivisible funds describes the funds as the basis of "public wealth" rather than of "kolkhoz wealth." The appeal to young men and women to develop the highest moral qualities does not address Komsomol members specifically as in the past, and includes a new directive for guarding the "revolutionary tradition." As in May, Soviet women are the "builders of communist society" rather than the "builders of communism" they were a year ago.

2. Propaganda on "Demobilization" of Military Equipment: As part of the continuing propaganda campaign related to the gradual demobilization of military personnel, their supposed eagerness to join the "front ranks of builders of communist society" and their idealized post-demobilization successes, there have appeared a series of reports of the conversion of military equipment and installations to peaceful, civilian uses. These include the use of converted tanks and other military tracked vehicles as

as civilian prime movers or freight carriers in difficult terrains (Izvestia of September 24 and Trud of October 7); IL-28 jet bombers employed as weather planes or "flying laboratories" (Izvestia of October 12 and Pravda of October 14), an old battleship being cut up for scrap (Izvestia of October 3), and the transfer of a naval repair installation to non-military jurisdiction for servicing fishing vessels (Leningradskaya Pravda of October 7). In all of these instances, demobilized or otherwise released armed forces personnel are seen happily applying their skills to civilian work in illustration of what must be the simplest possible form of transition to peaceful pursuits with nominal or no adjustment or training. The articles neglect to mention that released military personnel who continue to drive tanks, repair military prime movers or fly bombers are capable of making the reverse transition back into active military duty just as easily if necessary. (See Embassy Despatch No. 259 of October 14, 1960 for more details.)

3. "Public Opinion Institute": The Komsomol Central Committee organ Komsomolskaya Pravda has conducted a limited public opinion poll essentially on Soviet standard of living topics, results of which began to be reviewed at length in the October 7 issue under an emblem bearing the title "Komsomolskaya Pravda Institute of Public Opinion." Of a total of about 1600 questionaires distributed on one coach of each of 65 trains departing Moscow on 65 different routes, exactly 1399 were said to be valid for analysis. The rather "loaded" questions were: "(1) How has the level of your life changed in recent years? (gone up, stayed the same, gone down). (2) How was this evidenced, with what do you particularly associate it? (3) What problem do you consider most immediate? Underline: shortening of the working day, increase in the production of consumer goods, housing construction, improvement of consumer/public services, increase in production of food products, increase in wages, expansion of network of children's establishment. (4) What can you propose for the earliest resolution of the problem you have indicated?" Persons responding were asked to state occupation, age, sex, residence, members of family and which of them work and last, if willing, family name.

Perhaps surprised that this not-so-adventurous and only nominally independant poll worked well enough to be publicized or merely fascinated by what is still a daring and novel technique here, the journal first over-analyzed the sample to demonstrate its representative nature and since has been quoting extensively from the responses as well as publishing the supposedly expert views of Chairman of the State Committee for Construction Affairs V. A. KUCHERENKO, Chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages A.P.VOLKOV, and RSFSR First Deputy Minister of Trade D.D.KOROLEV (issue of October 8).

In essence, the new "Institute of Public Opinion" seems delighted to discover that an "overwhelming majority" of the sample thought their living standard had risen in recent years (capable of extrapolation back to the post-war crisis period), that housing construction, increase in wages, expansion of facilities for children and increase in food and consumer

goods production were, in decreasing order of priority, considered top current tasks, and that an "absolute majority" of the persons polled should play back fairly faithfully the opinions on these relatively non-controversial topics which they have been fed so consistently and persistently by the regime's propaganda machine.

4. Uncooperative Graduates of Higher Educational Institutions: The "ungrateful" attitude of many graduates of Soviet higher educational institutions evidenced by their often successful effort to avoid work and work sites chosen for them frequently has been the subject of press and orator criticism. This criticism, in some instances, has included angry demands that such persons be deprived of the "graduate" status and privileges by the revocation of their diplomas or be required to pay back the cost of their education to the state. Editorial comment on a letter making such criticism in Komsomolskaya Pravda of October 8 gives a better than usual indication of the scope of this problem. Thus it is revealed that of 1100 young teachers directed to work in Novosibirsk Oblast a third have still not shown up a month after the start of classes. Of the originating pedagogical institutes cited, it is not surprising that those in the relatively most cosmopolitan and important city, Moscow, seem to have the worst record in this regard. Of 99 graduates of two Moscow teacher training institutes who were supposed to start working in Novosibirsk Oblast this school year, 60 never reported for duty. The editorial comment again raises the demand that persons be forced to live up to their duties and responsibilities on pain of having to reimburse the state for their education and losing their diplomas.

5. Receipt of Gift Parcels in Latvia Discouraged: Soviet authorities have announced the arrest of four persons and the implication of 10 others in connection with illegal black-marketeering in parcels sent from the U.S. to Latvia. (Sovetskaya Latviya, October 6). Although concentrating on the operations of a particular "ring," the announcement serves as a threat to all persons who welcome gifts from abroad. Such persons are called "invisible defendants" without whose cooperation illegal operations could not be practiced.

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. Khrushchev's UN Mission: Unable to cite any concrete Soviet successes for Khrushchev's visit to the UNGA, other than attracting the presence of other heads of governments, the Soviet press says that its real significance was to prepare the ground for future Soviet victories. Thus the characteristic phrase in Soviet propaganda concerning this mission has been "planting seeds of peace." The press attributed lack of more concrete evidence in UNGA proceedings of the claimed change in the balance of forces in the UN to the inexperience of leaders of newly independent countries, "who do not know their own strength," and to the failure of certain governments (only one cited specifically was Yugoslavia) to speak out in favor of Soviet proposals.

There were several articles and cartoons attacking Hammarskjold, not only for his role in the Congo but also for his implementation of the Hungarian resolution, for his activity in the 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, the 1960 situation in Laos, and his alleged discrimination against employing Soviets in the Secretariat. The general message of these articles was that Hammarskjold, dating from his former experience as Chairman of the Swedish State Bank, has close connections with Western big business and therefore obeys US dictates when the chips are down. However, these attacks have not assumed the form of a concerted campaign against Hammarskjold and preliminary evaluations of UNGA during Khrushchev's presence there omit mention of Hammarskjold and the Congo.

7. The November 7 Slogans published Oct. 13 showed at least one possible revealing difference compared with the Nov. 1959 and May 1960 slogans. No. 15 on Communist China omitted the passage about Sino-Soviet friendship as a "powerful bulwark of peace in the whole world." The reference to bloc unity in No. 7 contains a new reference to the "fighting solidarity" of the Socialist camp. Other changes were indicative of the changed complexion of international relations during the past several months. The friendship of the US and Soviet peoples was mentioned in the same slogan along with Britain and France, whereas in November 1959 and May 1960 the US-Soviet theme was treated separately. A new slogan specifically greeted the people of Congo.

8. Postponement of Khrushchev's Visit to North Korea. Announcement that Khrushchev will not visit North Korea probably is related to the Sino-Soviet quarrel. It also is possible that the opportunity for lobbying among Asian-African leaders and for probing Western weaknesses in New York caused Khrushchev to forego the Korean trip. Since the Khrushchev visit to Korea was first announced on August 12, there has been no evidence that the Soviets and Chinese Communists have been able to narrow their differences, despite mutual claims that there is no disagreement on basic issues. On the contrary, the battle of words continues and it now seems fairly well established that the quarrel has involved reprisals, such as the partial withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China. The publication of the fourth volume of Mao Tse-tung's works, which so far has not been mentioned by the Soviet press, is bound to add fuel to the flames. Under these circumstances Khrushchev may have concluded that a visit to North Korea at present would exacerbate Soviet differences with the Chicoms and therefore decided to postpone it. This would seem applicable either if the North Korean trip had been intended primarily as an effort to strengthen Soviet influence in North Korea at the expense of the Chicoms or if it was for the purpose of holding a meeting with Mao Tse-tung or other Chicom leaders in Korea.

9. Ideological issues involving Moscow-Peiping relations continue to be the subject of discussion in the Soviet press and periodicals, though the CPR is not mentioned by name in the many attacks on leftism and sectarianism. The heavy incidence of ideological articles critical of positions easily identifiable with the Chinese Communists bears witness

to the sharpness of the continuing divergences between the Soviets and the Chinese, as well as to the important effort currently being made by Moscow to indoctrinate the Soviet people. During the past week the following articles were relevant to the ideological debate:

(a) The latest number (No. 10) of Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn contained an article "Contemporary War - Its Character and Consequences" by Major General N. Talenskiy in which the author, after painting an apocalyptic picture of nuclear war, states: "Not to see the danger of rocket-nuclear war is harmful, to see and underestimate it is criminal." He adds that it would be "anti-humanist" to argue that, because capitalism would be finally buried in a new war, the sacrifices of war, however heavy, are justified.

(b) Soviet Patriot (Oct. 9) contains an article on distribution according to labor and material incentive as conditions for construction of Socialism which sharply deprecates the early post-1917 Soviet agricultural communes and, by implication, contemporary Chinese Communist practice. The direction of the criticism is made clear by references to people who at the present time suffer from the infantile disease of leftism and try to leap over the Socialist stage of development direct to Communism.

(c) The latest issue (No. 14) of Kommunist has several articles with overtones of Sino-Soviet strain.

One is an article "Eleventh Anniversary of the CPR" by S. Tikhvinskiy which is notable chiefly by its careful avoidance of anything touching on controversy. However, it quietly makes several points with a bearing on Moscow-Peiping differences. It stresses the importance of bloc (i.e. Soviet) political and economic support for the Chinese Communists before and after 1949. It briefly alludes to the communes as "large collective enterprises." Finally, as if to nail down CPR adherence to Soviet positions, it remarks: "The signature of the CPC stands under the Declaration of communist and workers parties adopted in Moscow in 1957, alongside the signature of the CPSU and the parties of the other countries of the Socialist camp. This signature also stands under the historical document of the Bucharest meeting in June 1960."

Another article, "Toward A New Rise in Ideological Work," by L. Ilichev, is more pointedly directed at the ideological debate. It refers to "scornfully fruitless and groundless fantasying" involved in mastering Marxist book-learning divorced from real life and work. Along the same lines, it quotes the passage from Khrushchev's June 21 Bucharest speech on the theme "Marx and Engels are no longer with us." At another point it dismisses as "dogmatics and super-wellers" those who deprecate the importance of material incentive in Soviet construction.

Yet another article "International Forum of The Communist Movement" positively evaluates the bloc journal Problems of Peace and Socialism without once alluding to the CPR or contributions by Chinese Communists.

10. Berlin-Germany: A modest but market increase in the volume of propaganda charges against alleged West German militarism appeared in the Soviet press this week. However, the question of Berlin continued to be soft-pedalled.

On Oct. 11 all papers printed or summarized the joint Soviet-Polish-Czech declaration warning against the consequences of revanchism and equipping the Bundeswehr with modern weapons. Earlier the Soviet note of Oct 6 to the US on the same subject was published. Several other articles "exposing" West German militarism also appeared, usually within the context of the follow-up on eleventh anniversary of the GDR.

The contrast between the increased attention to West Germany and the virtual absence of references to the current developments in Berlin indicates that the Soviets are apparently continuing to follow a policy of "playing down Berlin" for the Soviet public. Presidium member Kozlov, whose toast at the anniversary celebration was printed Oct. 8, referred only briefly to Berlin repeating the standard Soviet contention that "the West Berlin Occupation regime" is a danger to peace. FedRep abrogation of the IZT agreement drew critical editorial comment in Pravda Oct. 9 and "GDR Ambassador" Doelling denounced the FedRep step in his published speech at the anniversary celebration, as "an agressive act against the GDR." No other references to Berlin appeared.

11. Algerian Leaders Visit: FLN leader, Ferhat Abbas, following his visit to Peking, stopped in the USSR for three days. During this time he and his party visited Leningrad and attended a quickly organized Moscow reception in their honor given by the Tunisian Ambassador. Deputy Prime Minister Kosygin, in a speech Oct. 10 on the occasion of Abbas' departure emphasized that the USSR has now granted "de facto recognition" to the Algerian regime.

12. The Geneva Nuclear Test Talks were the subject of several press articles. A tendentious Izvestiya (Oct.8) piece alleged that the US intended deliberately to break up the talks in order to resume nuclear testing. The article was especially critical of AEC Chairman McCone and Secretary Gates, referred darkly to a plot to break up the talks between the administration and the Congress, and attacked Senator Humphrey for his espousal of renewed US testing in the absence of agreement at the Geneva talks. Izvestiya in conclusion warned that US resumption would mean a heightened nuclear arms race in which other parties would be compelled to test bombs "of any power in any condition."

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